

3 Results-Based Matrix of Outcomes and Interventions

The Results-Based Matrix (table 3.1) and the Matrix Presenting Arrangements for Results Monitoring and Reporting (table 3.2) follow. **[introduction of these tables could have more detail. These table elements need to be less cryptic in some cases (as well as more consistent and parallel within similar sections of columns). Action and outcome columns need to NOT mix the future and past tense within same strands of phrases.]** **[where is the second matrix (table)?]**

**Table 3.1 Somali JNA—Results-Based Matrix
Governance, Security, and the Rule of Law Cluster**

Target Outcomes for 2011	Baseline 2006	Constraints to Achieving Outcomes by 2011	Key Actions and Intermediate Outcomes		
			2007	2008	2009–11
Reconciliation					
Reconciliation processes succeed in promoting DDR of militias and resolving land and property disputes; create conditions for transitional justice to satisfy the needs of Somali survivors; create a conducive environment for intercommunity dialogue and development of local governance, in which elections and political dialogue will	TFG based on negotiated formula for power sharing, not reconciliation. TFG agrees to land and property dispute settlement but has not established mechanisms or modalities for implementation. Charter mandates inclusiveness for all groups under the 4.5 formula and 12% quota for women. Active, armed conflict is occurring in parts of South Central	Constraints include mistrust of the state among many Somalis; zero-sum conception of the state by most political actors; existence of “conflict constituencies”; unresolved land and property issues; unaddressed past crimes and human rights violations; entrenched culture of impunity; culturally sanctioned discrimination of women, youth, and	TFIs and S-C: Three commissions— National Commission for Reconciliation, Land and Property Disputes Commission, and Parliamentary Committee for Reconciliation and Property Restitution supported and operational. [[hard to follow—separate with commas]] Policy developed for settlement of land disputes for returnees. CSOs, traditional leaders, warlords, and other conflict leaders and citizens	TFIs and S-C: TFI institutions active in reconciliation, with citizen support and warlord participation; major disputes in process of settlement. Policy implemented for settlement of land disputes for returnees. Dialogue started on linking of justice, truth, and reconciliation processes. Participation of women, youth, and minority groups monitored;	TFIs & S-C : TFI structures responsible for peace-building and reconciliation supported (National Commission for Reconciliation; Land and Property Disputes Commission; Parliamentary Committee for Reconciliation and Property Restitution. CSOs involved in this field supported; inter-community dialogue encouraged and citizen participation in state-building

<p>enable inclusive participation of all groups of society, including youth, women, and minority groups.</p> <p>For Somaliland and Puntland: Processes of reconciliation are further developed for dialogue toward dispute settlement, including youth, women, and minority groups.</p>	<p>Somalia;[[can't tell what it's saying]] DDR is pending in S-C.</p>	<p>minority groups, leading to widespread political exclusion and gender-based violence; weak capacity of TFIs; lack of demonstrated commitment of warring factions in parts of S-C; competing clan interests a barrier to inclusion; scepticism of many leaders throughout all Somali regions regarding effectiveness of reconciliation by TFIs; fragmented efforts of reconciliation impaired by disputes in other districts or communities; continued interference by foreign or diaspora interests. [[I added a subject at the top just to justify a period at end to</p>	<p>participating in reconciliation activities of the TFIs. Mechanisms for continued dialogue created; TFI reconciliation institutions linked to DDR process for stronger commitment to demobilization and better reintegration.</p> <p>National dialogue on issues linked to reconciliation instruments, local reconciliation processes linked to TFI institutions for better coverage of issues, and local initiatives supported.</p> <p>Participation of women, youth, and minority groups monitored; specific targets for representatives set and inclusion of issues implemented; training workshops conducted for women, youth, and minority groups, including key commission leadership, to effectively participate in commissions for reconciliation.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland:</p>	<p>specific targets for representation and inclusion of issues implemented.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland: Recommendations on further dialogue toward dispute settlement followed up and supported and links established to TFG reconciliation process.</p> <p>Participation of women, youth, and minority groups monitored; specific targets for representation and inclusion of issues implemented.</p>	<p>promoted, especially local governance; local reconciliation processes supported in strategic areas and regions; truth, justice, and reconciliation processes linked, and mechanism for transitional justice established.</p> <p>Participation of women, youth, and minority groups monitored, and specific targets for representation and inclusion of issues implemented. [[Don't mix future and past tenses; I changed to past tense]] Somaliland and Puntland: Ongoing processes of reconciliation and dialogue being developed and substantial dispute settlement achieved; participation of</p>
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		match other columns]]	Committee to review reconciliation process established and supported, with monitoring and specific targets for participation of women, youth, and minority groups.		women, youth, and minority groups monitored, and specific targets for representation and inclusion of issues implemented.
Rule of Law					
Improved and equal access of all Somali people, including vulnerable and poor men, women, and children to basic structures for the administration of justice, functioning in accordance with international human rights standards; all Somalis respectful of the rule of law and aware of their rights and empowered to exercise them.	Three sources of law (customary, shari'a, secular) overlap and are sometimes contradictory. Challenge of establishing clear, effective links between the three different legal frameworks; poor qualification of judges and lawyers; institutional weakness of courts and legal processes; general public ignorance and distrust of the formal judicial system. Most key statutes outdated. Inequality of all Somalis before the law and unequal protection under the	Constraints of formal judiciary structures: –weak capacities to introduce legislative changes in the legal framework; –lack of a strategic framework to develop the judicial system in a systematic manner; –low or absent representation of women and minorities in judicial structures; –access to justice constrained by economic, social, cultural, juridical, and physical factors. Customary law is most accessible	All regions: TFI Task Force on Judicial Development and Integration created; dialogue supported with links to constitutional dialogue. Full inventory and needs of judicial infrastructure evaluated and strategic development plans developed, costs estimated, and priorities set. Study on barriers to access to justice conducted, with participatory and consultative methodology; study on weaknesses in criminal justice chain initiated. Comprehensive national and regional plans for legal reforms and capacity development program	All regions: Strategic framework finalized and implementation plans developed for implementation of judicial integration. Basic structures approved, staff recruited, systems to implement vision started. Content of legal training developed with lessons from quick-impact programs. Weaknesses in criminal justice chain discussed, and citizen participation and strategies to address them developed. Studies undertaken on long-term regulation	TFG (S-C and Puntland) Priority 1: Strategic frameworks developed for vision and integration of three sources of law. Basic structures, staff, systems, and processes in place and in operation to implement vision; legal training provided. Weaknesses in criminal justice chain identified and process to address them under way. Addressing of land rights issues begun, through rule of law. Rehabilitation and construction of buildings with

	<p>law, especially for women, children, and minorities.</p>	<p>system, but limitations include conflicts with international human rights standards and discrimination against women.</p> <p>Shari'a courts, found mostly in cities, remain weak given lack of qualifications of shari'a judges; some cases of influence by warlords, faction leaders, and new Islamic groups.</p>	<p>developed.</p> <p>Quick-impact legal training conducted.</p> <p>Quick-impact construction of judicial infrastructure undertaken.</p> <p>Civic education strategy initiated and advocacy materials on citizen rights and access to justice prepared, linked to constitutional dialogue civic education process.</p> <p>Quick-impact training in human rights developed and conducted for TFG members and key officials of informal courts.</p> <p>Strategy for strengthening respect for human rights developed with informal justice representatives and TFG.</p> <p>CSOs' advocacy role and engagement strengthened.</p> <p>Basic sensitization, training,</p>	<p>and mediation of land and property disputes by judicial bodies.</p> <p>Long-term judicial infrastructure program started.</p> <p>Support to national human rights commissions undertaken.</p> <p>Civic education on citizen rights and access to justice started (3-year activity); pilot activities from studies on normative issues undertaken in select districts, linked with rollout of civic education.</p> <p>CSO initiatives funded that link to judicial integration.</p> <p>Program to enhance access to justice developed and started, including legal fund to enhance access for</p>	<p>equipment concluded for quick-impact response and under way for long term.</p> <p>Priority 2: Barriers to access understood and strategy to enhance access developed. Support provided for legal awareness and legal and paralegal services; partnerships with nonstate providers of justice established; reforms to state institutions to improve access identified and implemented.</p> <p>Priority 3: Normative framework in place to protect rights; culture of human rights developed within rule-of-law institutions; HR institutions established and strengthened and working in partnership with rule-of-law institutions; oversight</p>
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			<p>and discussion of gender issues developed and conducted for TFG members, CSOs, and leading traditional and religious leaders.</p> <p>Child rights strategy developed.</p> <p>Specific gender issues considered in every activity and gender targets developed and monitored.</p> <p>Study on normative framework to protect rights undertaken in all regions, including access to justice and human rights issues.</p>	<p>women, minority groups, disabled, and underaged; CSOs and professional groups supported to provide legal and paralegal services.</p> <p>Implementation of child rights, gender rights, and human rights strategies under way, with short-, medium-, and long-term goals specified, including mechanisms for redress of gender-based violence at all levels; gender issues considered in every activity and gender targets developed and monitored.</p>	<p>and accountability structures established or strengthened. Gender strategy developed and implemented; child rights strategy developed and implemented; human rights monitored in all regions.</p> <p>Somaliland: Capacity building of formal courts supported, including infrastructure, training, and legal materials development.</p> <p>Access to justice improved through efficient performance of courts and enhanced awareness of rights by all citizens; gender issues considered in every activity and gender targets developed and monitored.</p>
Security[[put subheads of Security in a spanning head too,					

maybe Security—DDR					
<p>DDR: DDR substantially achieved in all Somali regions.</p>	<p>Somaliland: 50,000 combatants demobilized; 15,000–20,000 absorbed into army, police, government jobs; SOOYAAL facilitated reintegration but constrained by lack of resources.</p> <p>Puntland: Of 15,000 former militias, 6,500 retained in security forces or government jobs, 3,000 voluntarily demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life, 6,000 unemployed require reintegration assistance.</p> <p>Directorate of Demining, Demobilization, and Reintegration created, poorly resourced but well managed.</p>	<p>Large-scale migration of local population and militias; prevalent use of khat and other drugs, and mental problems related to drug use and traumatic experiences of violence. Violations of arms embargo; need for weapons controls; lack of support for DDR by command structure of militias. Lack of employment opportunities for demobilized people; low skill, educational and motivational levels of demobilized persons; “conflict constituencies”; weakness of public institutions. Lack of sex-disaggregated data on DDR.</p>	<p>Somaliland and Puntland: [[don’t mix tenses within strand (separate with periods)]]Comprehensive security sector review and restructuring process launched; analysis and proposal for optimal force and force reduction exercise undertaken and adopted, including preparation for reintegration assistance.</p> <p>Study of needs and assistance strategy undertaken for war widows, orphans, disabled, and war veterans; psychosocial and trauma counseling provided, especially for youth and children affected by war. [[tense changes back and forth within section. I put in past]]</p> <p>S-C: Conducting a comprehensive security sector review, with reference to the NSSP; [[spell out]] establishing DDR Commission.</p> <p>Select programs for DDR developed and launched</p>	<p>Somaliland and Puntland: Force reduction exercise completed and reintegration assistance delivered; implementation started of short- medium-term assistance for war widows, orphans, disabled, and war veterans.</p> <p>S-C: DDR continued; support systems for war widows, orphans, disabled, and war veterans designed and launched.</p> <p>Psychosocial counseling centers being established for girls and women affected by sexual abuse during conflict.</p>	<p>Somaliland and Puntland: Reviewing and restructuring security sector; conducting force reduction exercise; equipping and training remaining force; developing reintegration programs for demobilized forces; developing support systems for war widows, orphans, disabled. and war veterans.</p> <p>S-C: Targeting programs to areas where there is commitment to DDR; establishing DDR Commission within TFG; conducting comprehensive security sector review; developing and implementing DDR initiatives, as feasible; developing special programs for youth and child combatants;</p>

	S-C: Active fighting under way, immediate challenge to DDR.		where feasible, with TA[[spell out TA; add to key below table]] from Somaliland and Puntland. Special programs for youth and child combatants designed and launched; sex - disaggregated data on DDR compiled. Psychosocial and trauma counseling programs launched, including special programs for youth and children affected by war.		planning support systems for war widows, orphans, disabled, and war veterans.
POLICE: Effective, accountable civilian police service operational throughout all Somali regions, focused on local needs policing, within an overall national or federal security framework, with full involvement and cooperation of civil society.	Somaliland: Somaliland Police Force in existence, with membership from former militias; low representation of women in SPF; operating procedures similar to former Somalia Police Force of the 1970s; assistance from UNDP received; low education levels and skill levels still expected; force composition not	Somaliland and Puntland: Low budget; recruitment partially motivated by reconciliation objectives and not competitive recruitment; more training and equipment needed; greater professionalism needed; crime incidence and gender-specific crime an issue; information on	Somaliland and Puntland: Comprehensive strategy developed for integrated police force (formal and informal police); some informal police units mobilized as pilot under civilian command and control of police of the state, performing specific, delegated functions as part of integrated framework for policing; training designed and conducted on human rights for formal and informal police; skills development conducted for the force; assessment, costing, and	Somaliland and Puntland: Pilot absorption monitored and evaluated; strategy for long-term police integration initiated. Human rights and skills training continuing. Infrastructure and projects being implemented and equipped; implementing accountability measures; beginning implementation of improved conditions of service; implementing	Somaliland and Puntland: Police force (formal and informal police) integrated, with absorption of elements from informal police into state police. Somalia Police Force (SPF) being reactivated; police work continuing and being consolidated. Participation of women monitored and specific targets for participation implemented and

	<p>representative across regions.</p> <p>Puntland: PLPF reconstituted with intention of amalgamating into future SPF; force constituted of former police, military, and militias; operating procedures similar to those of deactivated SPF; assistance from UNDP received; police training academy at Arno in operation.</p> <p>South Central: SPF in process of reactivation; policing still done by informal groups from xeer bodies, warlords, faction leaders, business interests, shari'a courts. Strategic development plan for reactivation of</p>	<p>gender-based violence limited.</p> <p>South Central Somalia: Challenge of reactivating SPF with limited resources; estimate of need for 10,000 personnel with proper leadership, training, and equipment; currently only 600 spaces available for training in SPF Academy in Puntland; challenge of integrating informal and formal</p>	<p>prioritization of infrastructure needs done; quick-impact infrastructure and projects implemented and equipped; accountability measures developed.</p> <p>Program developed to improve conditions of service and increase recruitment and retention of women; rank structure evaluated; new standard operating procedures created; new uniforms designed and put into use. Participation of women monitored and specific targets for participation and inclusion of issues implemented.</p> <p>Puntland: Strategy for reactivation of SPF developed with TFG.</p> <p>S-C: Strategy to reactivate SPF developed, together with Puntland; capacity to implement NSSP[[spell out]] developed; human rights training for formal and informal police conducted, as feasible, using training of trainers[[is this right for TOT?]] from Puntland; assessment, costing, and</p>	<p>new rank structure and new standard operating procedures.</p> <p>Participation of women monitored and specific targets for participation and inclusion of issues implemented; training of police, judiciary, elders on senior gender-based violence begun. Launching program to improve police-community relations.</p> <p>S-C: Implementing strategy to reactivate SPF, as feasible; continuing implementation of NSSP[[spell out]]; expanding human rights and beginning skills training; continuing quick-impact</p>	<p>issues included.</p> <p>S-C: As peace permits, progressively reactivating SPF to ensure law and order; reviewing and continuing implementation of NSSP; ensuring that police practice respect for human rights; police being trained in skills and human rights. Police infrastructure being rebuilt; accountability measures being developed and conditions of police service being improved. Changing rank structure and reducing militaristic</p>
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	SPF prepared at Kampala Seminar (2005). National Security and Stabilization Plan (NSSP) prepared.	police to serve the various systems of the judiciary (formal and informal); many areas of S-C still in conflict, situation with DDR still pending.	prioritization of infrastructure needs conducted, where feasible; quick-impact infrastructure and projects implemented and equipped; accountability measures developed. Program to improve conditions of service developed. Participation of women monitored and specific targets for representatives and inclusion of issues implemented.	infrastructure and equipping projects; evaluating rank structure; creating new standard operating procedures; designing and putting into use new uniforms. Participation of women monitored and specific targets for participation and inclusion of issues implemented; capacity of gender and human rights networks expanded to support survivors of abuse. ; Launch program to improve police-community relations.	behaviors and procedures; creating new standard operating procedures; purchasing new uniforms. [[new uniforms were put into use in last column]] Participation of women monitored, specific targets for participation implemented, and issues included.
MINE ACTION: Mines and unexploded ordnance are substantially cleared, with survivors assistance programs established and national capacities for mine risk education and	Somaliland and Puntland: 75% high- and medium-priority areas cleared. One INGO each conducting mine and UXO clearance; no national capacity; two operational police EOD teams in Hargeisa and others trained, not operational; no	Somaliland and Puntland : Lack of international funding for national clearance capacity, training, equipment, and monitoring ; lack of technical procurement capacity ;Somaliland not considered « State Party », thus	Somaliland and Puntland: One trained/operational mine clearance team put in place in Somaliland Army and one in engineer component of Darawish, with C/CI and coordination mechanisms functioning; five police EOD trained and operational; IEDD training conducted for Hargeisa-based and Garowe-based police teams; monitoring and supervision	Somaliland and Puntland: Completion of one INGO program (all actions for each region); second national mine clearance team trained and operational; five police EOD operational; IEDD training of remaining police EOD teams begun; supervision and monitoring ongoing;	Somaliland and Puntland: Completing UNDP capacity-building support program. Government fully responsible for mine and UXO clearance; five trained police EOD operational, with C/C and M&E; training ongoing; reviewing IEDD

<p>clearance operational.</p>	<p>equipment or special training; limited command and control, coordination, reporting systems. [[repeats: see above in green]]Deed of Commitment signed by Somaliland govt.; limited MRE capacity (UNICEF assist); no central database on survivors or sustainable support network; limited specialized agencies for prosthesis; no emergency or casevac [[what is this evacuation term? not capped afro?]]capacity; SMAC and PMAC established but with limited coordination; policies and plans developed.</p> <p>South Central: No internationally supported mine</p>	<p>unable to accede to LMBT ; support needed for stockpile destruction ;limited health facilities for treatment of survivors ; international advisory and monitoring support withdrawn ; lack of interest from within gov and from International donors/UN</p> <p>South Central Somalia: Lack of international funding for national clearance capacity, training, equipment, operating expenses, and monitoring; lack of technical procurement</p>	<p>put in place; stockpile destruction being conducted. Government complying with Deed of Commitment. TA attached to the SMAC and PMAC and establishing five community liaison teams, with messages developed for radio/TV; TA team established in Ministry of Health. Developing and distributing literature and workshops on survivor needs; initiating employment program for survivors; SMAC functioning, with staff recruited and trained; procedures and equipment operational.</p> <p>[[DTP: put South Central and other regions so that they are aligned on a row.</p> <p>South Central Somalia: One mine clearance team for two mine-affected areas</p>	<p>stockpile destruction ongoing. Government complying with Deed of Commitment. TA attached to SMAC; five community liaison teams or LNGO active; public information continued; TA to Ministry of Health, workshops and employment programs for survivors continued; SMAC functioning; internal management procedures in place; systems in place for licensing; govt. contributing financial support to SMAC and PMAC.</p> <p>South Central Somalia: Two more mine clearance teams operational; six police EOD operational; C/C, M&E systems in place; IEDD training provided.</p>	<p>responses/needs; completing stockpile destruction. Government complying with Deed of Commitment; TA attached to SMAC; public information program ongoing. Sustaining TA team in Ministry of Health; workshops and employment for survivors ongoing; SMAC and PMAC beginning downsizing; IMSMA being maintained; international team withdrawn on completion of 2011 tasks.</p> <p>South Central Somalia: Capacity-building program being</p>
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	<p>clearance projects; some local knowledge and capacity in some areas; one trained police EOD team in Jowhar, not operational; no equipment or special training; limited capacity, no confirmation of targets, achievements, statistics; TFG willing to sign MBT when situation stable; limited or no advocacy conducted in S/C; no central database on survivors or sustainable support network; no known specialized agencies for prosthesis; no emergency or casevac capacity; no records on mine fields or UXO locations; no defined priorities; no operational plans;</p>	<p>capacity; TFP endorsement to sign MBT; resistance of factions and militias to declaring and surrendering stocks for disposal, not willing to participate; mine-affected areas inaccessible owing to security issues; some disputed borders of districts, regions; poor geospatial data; limited health facilities for treatment of survivors.</p>	<p>trained and operational, with command and control and coordination structures in place; three trained police EOD operational; IEDD training provided. Establishing C/C, coordination, and M&E systems; conducting stockpile destruction. TFG in compliance with Deed of Commitment; TA in place.</p> <p>Establishing community liaison teams or LNGO for public information; radio/TV campaign developed. Establishing TA team in Ministry of Health; developing literature, workshops, employment programs for survivors. LIS completed in two zones; survey teams recruited, trained, deployed; IMSMA established, equipped; QAM of LIS completed and results published; federal MACC established within TFIs; two regional MACCs established; policy drafted and submitted to TFP; strategy developed and coordination established</p>	<p>Conducting stockpile destruction; TFG complying with Deed of Commitment; TA advisers in place and community liaison teams or NGOs providing public information. Sustaining TA team in Ministry of Health; continuing survivor assistance programs. LIS completed in two more zones; survey teams operational and equipped; IMSMA operational; QAM of LIS completed and results published; federal MACC operational; mine action policies adopted and implementation started; MACC QA teams selected, trained, deployed.</p>	<p>completed, with federal government fully responsible; two trained EOD teams operational with C/C M&E, systems operational; IEDD training provided; stockpile destruction ongoing or completed; govt. compliant with Deed of Commitment; govt. meeting obligations of MBT; TA team downsized, with M&E functions retained; remainder of CLT/LNGO teams trained, equipped, deployed; TA team in Min. of Health sustained; survivors support programs ongoing; IMSMA maintained and updated; national and regional plans finalized; clearance operations for on high- and medium-priority areas nearing completion; federal MACC consolidated</p>
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	increased problems due to recent fighting; no management or coordinated mechanisms for mine action.		in TFG; Somali MACC staff recruited and trained; equipment procured; MACC QA teams selected, trained, deployed.		and operational without direct TA; two more regional MACCs established.
Government, Public Administration, & Accountability					
Constitutional Process: S/C and Puntland: New constitution for a federal Somalia prepared in an inclusive, participatory manner involving all sectors of the population and adopted by popular referendum, laying the groundwork for a legitimate federal Somali state.	Somaliland constitution in place; constitutional process not a major issue for Somaliland. TFG: Transitional federal charter mandates drafting and adoption of constitution within 2½ years. FCC appointed but not all committees and technical experts established (as of July 2006).	Process for drafting constitution not prescribed in charter. Opportunities for reconciliation created by process, but also risks of divisions and conflict over issues of land and property disputes, displaced persons, boundary disputes, and optional legal frameworks.	FCC, committees, and sub-committees established, with minimum representation of women and minorities on relevant issues and linked to sectoral reform processes under way by the TFG. Task forces established and supported to resolve transitional issues; inclusive and gender-responsive civic education campaign designed and launched; inclusive and gender-responsive constitutional dialogue developed and launched, with funding for civil society engagement.	Continued implementation of work of committees, task forces, civic education campaign, and constitutional dialogue; links to sectoral reform processes maintained; drafting of constitution supported and completed; validation process designed and prepared; participation and inclusion of all stakeholder views monitored; support to civil society continued.	Validation process implemented; new constitution launched with postlaunch civic education campaign designed and conducted, inclusive of women and minorities; support to civil society participation in constitutional process continued.
Democratization and Electoral Processes					
Multiparty democracy with inclusion of women, youth, and minority groups	Clan-based selection of representative to decision-making bodies; no census or voter registration systems; no legal	Historical experience of clan-based political parties; little or no experience with democratic	TFG: Research being conducted on political participation in local communities, which can contribute to democratic processes; research being	TFG: Establishing independent electoral commission; drafting and adopting electoral legal framework; preparing to conduct	TFG: Institutional support extended to parliament, the electoral commission, and local authorities for electoral

<p>effective in all Somali regions, with capacity built to move from a clan-based system toward multiparty democracy.</p>	<p>frameworks in place; almost no participation of women or youth in “selected” offices and few women in upper-level government jobs, or other positions of authority or leadership.</p>	<p>elections; lack of infrastructure for census and registration processes; low literacy level; lack of participation by women and youth in positions of authority, working against their running for office and being elected.</p>	<p>conducted on inclusion of women, youth, and other underrepresented groups.</p> <p>Puntland: Political party system being created; civic/voter education being prepared and conducted, with special focus on gender and youth participation, including affirmative action; presidential and parliamentary elections in preparation.</p> <p>Somaliland: Institutional support extended to Parliament, the electoral commission, and local authorities; voter registration system being established; constitutional and electoral legislation review beginning. Supporting CSO in civic education; preparing for local and presidential elections</p>	<p>national census and voter registration; designing civic education for electoral process. with special focus on gender and youth issues and participation; supporting affirmative action for women; preparing for multiparty system with civic education and training of civil society leadership.</p> <p>Puntland: Preparing to conduct presidential and parliamentary elections, with special focus on participation and increase of women, youth, and other underrepresented groups to elected office; affirmative action being supported.</p> <p>Somaliland: Constitutional legal review continued; civic/voter education supported, with focus on participation and</p>	<p>processes; census and voter registration being conducted; civic/voter education being prepared and conducted, with special focus on gender and youth participation.</p> <p>Puntland: Presidential elections being conducted; civic/voter education being prepared and conducted, with special focus on gender and youth participation.</p> <p>Somaliland: Elections 2008/2010 prepared and conducted;[[repeated below]] CSO participation as monitors supported; civic/voter education</p>
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			2007–08; civic/voter education being prepared and conducted, with special focus on gender and youth participation.	increase of women, youth, and other underrepresented groups in elected office; affirmative action for women supported; local elections conducted; presidential elections 2008 conducted.	being prepared and conducted, with special focus on gender and youth participation.
Architecture of Government					
Minimal, lean, efficient federal structure of institutions to serve regions and localities and embody good governance processes of transparency, accountability, and participation; decentralization structures for local governance well defined and operational.	Transitional charter with established tiers and basic functions of government; existing composition of 275 members of Parliament with 84 ministers and deputy ministers and five ministers of state; too many ministries for the available resources; no civil service; 12% official quota for women but only 8% currently in parliament.	General distrust of government by citizens and civil society leadership; tendency to apportion influence and positions to clans; lack of practice of accountability, transparency, and participation; specific responsibilities or functions of each tier of government not identified by charter.	TFG: Study to determine optimal functions for each tier of government being conducted according to charter; detailed functions for each ministry and department being developed, staffing needs, budget and recruitment, and deployment plan being determined for each ministry and department. Parliaments of Somaliland, Puntland, and TFP: Developing capacity-building programs for roles and functions of representatives of constituencies; developing principles of good	TFG: begin to Implementation of plan for federal, state, regional, and local architecture of government beginning according to budgets and resource capacity. Parliaments of Somaliland, Puntland, and TFP: [[fix when meaning is clear in column to left]] Implementing capacity building programs for roles and	TFG: Implementation of plan for federal, state, regional, and local architecture of government continuing, with objective of minimal, lean, efficient federal structure of institutions, with Puntland integrated into federal architecture of government; decentralization structures and functions well defined and basically operational. Parliaments of Somaliland, Puntland, and TFP: [[Fix

			governance, with support for committees, especially those with oversight functions; staff and TA for priority sectoral issues hired (security sector, PFM[[spell out or put in key below table]], local governance, and service delivery); hiring staff and TA for legal drafting. [[this whole section needs restructuring so it's clear; fix other two columns accordingly]]	functions as representatives of their constituencies; [[sense?]]] principles of good governance developed; support continued for committees, especially those with oversight functions; staff and TA for priority sectoral issues hired (security sector, PFM, local governance and service delivery); staff and TA for legal drafting hired.	meaning according to two preceding columns, which didn't make sense as constructed]]Developing capacity for roles and functions as representatives of their constituencies; principles of good governance developed; support given for committees, especially those with oversight functions; staff and TA hired for priority sectoral issues (security sector, PFM, local governance, and service delivery); staff and TA hired for legal drafting.
Capacity for Government Institutions and Civil Service					
Technically competent, operationally efficient, and accountable public institutions, capable of building peace and promoting human development to	No civil service; weak or nonexistent financial management systems and competencies; understaffed Parliament and mostly inexperienced MPs.	Contradiction between desire for effective government and lack of resources to support it; citizen expectations that peace and creation of TFIs should result in improvement of	TFG: Establishing capacity-building program for Parliament; establishing Civil Service Commission; recruiting directors and key staff trained in policy analysis, human resource management, public financial management, other critical capacities; recruiting and	TFG: Beginning comprehensive capacity building for all civil servants. Gender equity and access promoted with affirmative action policies developed and applied. Establishing	TFG: Civil Service Commission established; recruitment and training policies adopted; codes of conduct adopted and civil servants trained in ethics, transparency, and

<p>achieve the Millennium Development Goals.</p>		<p>the economy, employment, and service delivery; need to deliver a “peace dividend”; need to reintegrate militias with low skill levels or adaptability for absorption into public sector institutions; no systematic human resource development for government service in over 15 years; few trainers available for civil service capacity building; little experience of citizens or public servants with systems of accountability, transparency, and participation.</p>	<p>training key staff for select ministries; training all civil servants in ethics, transparency, accountability; preparing comprehensive capacity program for TFG; using ICT for training; conducting needs assessment for gender-sensitive training.</p> <p>Gender equity and access promoted, with affirmative action policies developed and applied.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland: Developing civil service reform; setting policy for staffing structures, functions, salaries, recruitment, promotion, training; developing capacity in ministries for planning, policy analysis, and monitoring of social service provision for partnerships with nonstate actors; strengthening transparency and accountability; evaluating and strengthening auditor general’s office; developing comprehensive capacity-building program for civil</p>	<p>partnerships with Somaliland and Puntland civil services, especially for training.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland: Implementing civil service reform, including rightsizing; beginning comprehensive capacity building for civil service; monitoring performance of transparency and accountability and further developing systems, especially in financial management and human resource management; establishing partnerships with TFG civil service; using ICT for training and coordination; promoting gender equity</p>	<p>accountability; performance systems established and personnel trained for monitoring and evaluation; rightsizing conducted; gender equity and access promoted, with affirmative action policies.</p> <p>Somaliland and Puntland: Lean, competent, rightsized civil service recruited and trained, with systems for accountability and transparency established in every office; special systems for accountability and transparency created, in operation for financial management and periodically reviewed by independent evaluators; ICT used for training and</p>
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			service, in coordination with TFG; using ICT for training and coordination; conducting needs assessment for gender-sensitive training; promoting gender equity and access with affirmative action policies; incorporating conflict sensitivity and peace building into policies and training.	and access with affirmative action policies.	coordination; gender equity and access promoted with affirmative action policies; conflict sensitivity and peace building incorporated into policies and training.
Local Governance					
Well-defined, operational decentralization structures for local governance in all Somali regions, with functional and fiscal decentralization that are participatory and inclusive of all population groups, including women; that facilitate delivery (directly or indirectly) of good-quality, reliable, affordable, and sustainable	All regions: Following 1991 collapse of the state, subsequent fragmentation, and “localization of politics”: local initiatives and nonstate actors emerged to provide services; formal systems replaced by informal structures of local governance. S/C: No formal local government in operation. Puntland: Decentralization system adopted for	Citizen confidence in local governance but lack of resources to effectively support vigorous local service delivery; gap in access to social services, especially by poor and rural-pastoralist populations; lack of confidence or practice of taxation for local governance; Decentralization mandated by TFC, but no solution to lack of resources at local level.	TFG and S-C: Supporting select districts in reconciliation and peace-building initiatives that include social service provision and resource mobilization by community bodies with transparency and accountability; supporting involvement of informal local governance bodies in the constitutional dialogue. Somaliland and Puntland: Government assisted with conducting comprehensive review of service delivery in	TFG and S-C: Preparing for formal structures of local governance in accordance with the constitutional dialogue. Somaliland and Puntland: Continuing capacity building and civic education for transparency, accountability, and participation in local	TFG and S-C: Supporting development of local governance, as mandated in the new constitution; developing implementation plans for fiscal and functional decentralization and programs to promote participation and inclusion of all population groups in local governance; developing and supporting affirmative action for women, youth, and minorities in local government structures.

<p>services to all citizens; and that contribute to reconciliation and bridge the urban/rural-pastoralist divide through effective pro-poor policies.</p>	<p>devolution of services to district councils, but not fully operational; low budgets, low capacity to deliver.</p> <p>Somaliland: System of decentralization to district councils in place; low service delivery due to low level of resources; some limited revenue transfers.</p> <p>Both Somaliland and Puntland: Gap in access to services of poor and rural-pastoralist populations; self-appointed regional administrations in some regions; selected officials in most localities; district councils more successful than regional bodies.</p>		<p>all districts; planning tool for use in social service provision and monitoring developed. For Puntland, selection of all district councils completed; incorporation of gender issues into all policies ensured, including affirmative action for employment and access to services.</p>	<p>governance; developing comprehensive training program for local government staff, especially those in financial management and human resource management; ensuring that gender issues are incorporated into all policies, including affirmative action for employment and access to services.</p>	<p>Somaliland and Puntland: Supporting implementation of decentralization reform; supporting the administrative capacity of existing local governments to design viable fiscal systems and develop plans for service delivery to all constituents through partnerships with nonstate actors or with direct service provision; building capacity for better accountability, transparency, and citizen participation; developing plans for local elections; implementing “conferences of service” to assess, evaluate, and plan modalities to extend services to all constituents; providing investment funds to develop</p>
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					social capital and to encourage and leverage local resource mobilization for capital development for social services; ensuring that gender issues are incorporated into all policies, including affirmative action for employment and access to services.
CIVIL SOCIETY, PARTICIPATION And MEDIA[[doesn't separate columns by region under this heading]]					
Civil Society and Participation: Legitimate and credible NGOs, CSOs, umbrellas, and professional associations working with increased capacity to support peace, democracy, and reconciliation in all Somali regions; increased coordination and collaboration among NGOs, women's groups, and other nonstate	Mapping of civil society available (Oxfam Netherlands and Saferworld); code of conduct (2002) not being used; no compliance mechanisms for self-regulation; various projects under way to build nonstate capacity for peace, reconciliation, and democratic processes (Oxfam Netherlands, Saferworld, WSP-international); nonstate actor	Difficult, sometimes tense relations between civil society and governing authorities in each region; governing authorities sometimes seeing sector competing for resources; civil society sometimes perceiving authorities as lacking legitimacy and not concerned with welfare of the people.	Study conducted on previous compliance mechanisms and proposal developed for enhanced self-regulation mechanisms with compliance and arbitration mechanisms; TFG, Somaliland, and Puntland govts. supported to develop legal framework and registration for NGOs and CSOs; civil society organizations supported, with specific projects for participation in constitutional dialogue, development of gender participation in governance at all levels, engagement in the reconciliation process, human	Civil society self-regulation mechanisms adopted and supported by NGO consortium, including codes of conduct adopted by at least 50% of major NGOs, professional associations, and umbrella organizations in all regions.	Civil society organizations adopting and using codes of conduct; self-regulation mechanisms being endorsed and used by at least 75% of NGOs, CSOs, and professional associations, including mechanisms for compliance and arbitration; civil society organizations engaged by govt. in predictable and meaningful ways, especially in poverty

<p>actors; taking on of active advocacy role with authorities and channels of dialogue established and respected by civil society and the authorities; influence and participation of civil society in poverty reduction strategies, peace building, and decentralization processes.</p>	<p>working groups established in each region; NSA forum emerging; INGOs supporting improved accountability of NGOs and CSOs; training of civil society on the EU and Cotonou agreements undertaken in all regions; Somaliland election process includes broad participation of civil society.</p>		<p>rights, and access to justice (see also Rule of Law).[[verify title in table, to cross reference]]</p>		<p>reduction strategies and participation in democratic processes.</p>
<p>Media and Information: Numerous and diverse media channels and outlets functioning with independence and integrity; providing information, education, recreation, and culture for all Somalis, with</p>	<p>Weak Information delivery capacities of radio stations, with low professional skills; no independent or self-regulated body to establish codes of conduct for ethics and professionalism; interference of local authorities in some cases with broadcasting by</p>	<p>State monopoly of media (1969–90) creating distrust of role of government in media policy or regulations; multiple radio stations controlled by factions perpetuating practice and public perception of media as a tool for special interests; lack of training of media</p>	<p>Design of communication and information platform being supported, including media outlets and ICT, to facilitate dialogue and promote objective transmission of information and news with impartiality and professionalism; limited scale and complementary infrastructure being supported to enable some outlets to expand coverage quickly, in support of emerging</p>	<p>Developing a communication and information policy framework; supporting investment in community media or select private outlets to implement the design of a communications and information platform, including ICT, covering all Somali districts; continuing to support media programming that</p>	<p>Supporting university and technical education, including using ICT, for journalists and communication specialists, including ethics and new technologies; supporting special training in gender issues; promoting affirmative action for youth and women in</p>

<p>gender sensitivity and using a diversity of methods of dissemination and technology, including ICT, to reach and engage all Somalis.</p>	<p>radio or TV stations or program reception.</p>	<p>and communications personnel.</p>	<p>constitutional, reconciliation and recovery initiatives. Supporting media programming that enables dialogue and presentation of different viewpoints, especially the views of women, youth, and underrepresented groups.</p>	<p>enables dialogue and presentation of different viewpoints, especially the views of women, youth, and underrepresented groups; supporting training of journalists and communications personnel to increase their professionalism, especially in ethics and new technologies; promoting affirmative action for women and youth in the media.</p>	<p>the media.</p>
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IMSMA = ; NSSP = National Security and Stabilization Plan.

ANNEXES

Maps

[[number figures consecutively, A.1, A.2, etc.; say where maps are from, leaving original identification if part of JNA]]

Map A1: Distribution of settlements by system of governance, as perceived by the communities
<<insert figure A.1 about here>>

Map A3: Provision of justice within settlements, as perceived by the communities

Map A4: Reconciliation of disputes within settlements, as perceived by the communities

Map A6: Presence of social groups within settlements (cultural group or association)**[[parenthetical description is not on figure title]]**

Map A7: Presence of social groups within settlements (women's group/association)
[[parenthetical description is not on figure title]]

Map A8: Presence of social groups within settlements (community security group)
[[parenthetical description is not on figure title; also, if map remains, it and A6 and A7 should have different titles to say what map shows]]**[[figure is not called out in text]]**

Map B2: Human rights and security (current status), law and order**[[law and order is not on title of map; need to add]]****[[titles should give date, in addition to or instead of the term "current status"]]**

Map B3: Human rights and security (current status), settlement of disputes**[[fix title on map, to match this, but map needs callout in text if keeping]]**

Map I9: Availability of Internet and e-mail facilities within settlements

Map I10: Availability of newspapers/newsletters **[[add]]**within settlements

Map J3: Awareness of land mines or unexploded ordnance (UXO)

Annex to Somali JNA Governance, Security, and Rule of Law Cluster Report

The Political Context

1. In 1960, British Somaliland and Italian Somalia peacefully united to form the Republic of Somalia, but the country experienced only nine years of multiparty democracy before the 1969 coup d'état by Mohamed Siad Barre. **[[sometimes Siyad—which spelling?]]** In its first decade, Siad Barre's government aligned itself with the Soviet bloc and followed a *dirigist* economic planning model that proved unsuccessful at generating economic growth and sustainable development. **[[need to define dirigist]]** Somalia's defeat in the 1978 war with Ethiopia, coupled with mounting domestic dissatisfaction with governance and economic performance, proved a turning point on both the political and economic fronts. On the international and economic policy front, the regime switched political allegiance to the Western camp and in the early 1980s began a partial, gradual, and reluctant program of financial and economic liberalization, while at the same time maintaining political control over key economic assets and institutions.

2. On the domestic political front, the response by Siad Barre's regime to the mounting internal threat to its political survival was to centralize power around the president and to fan and exploit clan rivalries, beginning with the harsh repression meted against the clan to which most of the leaders of the 1978 failed coup belonged. Loyalty replaced merit, as Siad Barre became increasingly reliant on nepotism and patronage. The state's controls over domestic resources and aid were used to reward selectively pliant subclans and their leaders and businesspeople and punish disloyal ones. Such tactics fueled the rise during the 1980s of armed clan- and subclan-based opposition movements, first in the northeastern region, and then the northwestern, southern, and central regions of Somalia—everywhere but the southwestern part of the country, in which Siad Barre's family originated.

3. Both before and after the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, clan elders and militia leaders proved incapable of forging an alternative political arrangement to govern the country and prevent the collapse of the central government. The resulting protracted civil war among clan militias brought widespread human rights abuses against the civilian population.⁵⁴ In the first half of the 1990s in South Central Somalia, the civil war destroyed most of the social and economic infrastructure, forced the displacement of large populations, disrupted food supplies, and led to mass starvation. The international community mounted an unprecedented humanitarian and military operation (first led by the United States and then by the UN) but failed to end factional fighting or engender a process of national reconciliation. Since the failed peacemaking attempts by U.S. and UN missions in the early 1990s, a low-intensity state of conflict and anarchy has persisted in southern and central Somalia, with only small pockets having established localized and weak forms of governance in recent years.

4. The Bay and Bakool regions established a well-structured regional authority under the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and later under the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA). However, the administration collapsed twice, first in 1996 after rival militias occupied the region, and again in 1999 after differences within the RRA led to fierce fighting within its

ranks and insecurity in the region. A process of reconciliation was initiated in July 2004 but has yet to be finalized.

5. In August 2000, a Somali National Peace Conference in Djibouti formed a transitional federal government (TFG)[**change—majority of references to the national govt. is to federal TFG**]]. However, the TFG[**change?**] was unable to establish itself as an effective administration beyond a small area in and around Mogadishu, and its official mandate expired during the summer of 2003. Recurring clashes among local clan-based militias frequently break out, with the Banaadir region, which includes the capital Mogadishu, subject to recurring conflict. However, Mogadishu is also the seat of a very vibrant commercial sector, expanding educational institutions, and shari'a courts under different jurisdictions. It is also the seat of some remnant of local police under the defunct TFG[**change to TFG here?**] and several sea and airports controlled by factional leaders. In the Lower Shabelle region, serious conflict over the control of the rich agricultural and marine resources continues to prevent formation of a regional authority. Different political and militia groups claim ownership of various pieces of land and the control of the port city of Merca. In recent years, the political and security situation has been relatively stable in the Middle Shabelle region.

6. The administrative and security situation is similarly unsettled in the Lower Juba area, around the port of Kismaayo near the Kenyan border. A clan-based regional authority followed the collapse of UNOSOM administrative structures after 1994. Since then, the port and the surrounding agricultural and forest resources have been contested. They changed hands among different factions a number of times until in late 1999 another clan-based movement, the Juba Valley Authority, established a firmer grip. The Middle Juba and Gedo regions have similarly seen little peace or any semblance of organized administrative authority since the civil war started. The Gedo region also experienced military incursions from Ethiopia, ostensibly to pacify the common border area of any element of Islamic militant groups.

7. To the northwest of Mogadishu, in parts of Mudug and Galgaduud regions, the governors and district commissioners who were appointed under the UNOSOM in 1993 still claim authority, but with no visible authority or legitimacy to govern. No structures exist for providing public services, but parallel power structures run by elders and Islamic shari'a courts operate in the region. Similarly, in the Hiraaan region, no elected authority exists. The governor—who was appointed in early 1993 and served until his death in 2004—and other local administrative bodies exercised little authority and had little capacity to deliver any social service. Traditional leaders and an array of other civic groups and Islamic shari'a courts maintain some security.

8. The northern regions, in contrast, managed—for a longer time and with considerable success—to limit internal and external violent confrontations, establish functioning political and administrative organs of governance, and ensure relative personal security. Since formally seceding from the rest of Somalia in May 1991, the regional state of Somaliland in the northwest has been rebuilding state structures within the boundaries of the former British protectorate. Also, following the failure of various national reconciliation efforts, the regional state of Puntland was formed in August 1998 as an autonomous self-governing entity in the northeastern region—albeit one still wed to the long-term goal of Somali unity. Both regional states claim

political control over two border areas, Sanaag and Sool, where there are divided loyalties to either side.

9. Although it was twice affected by civil strife (1992 and 1994–96), Somaliland has managed to establish a bicameral parliament, judiciary, police force, and municipal structures and to hold a locally financed referendum on a constitution in May 2001, local elections in December 2002, and presidential elections in April 2003. Despite Somaliland’s claim to independence, however, it has not secured political recognition by the international community, which continues to uphold the territorial integrity of Somalia. Relative security has revitalized the economy, private activity, remittance flows, and an active NGO sector. In partnership with the private sector and other civil society organizations, Somaliland also has succeeded in restoring basic public services and attracting reconstruction and development assistance, though at modest levels.

10. In Puntland, the failure to agree on a transfer of power at the end of the previous administration’s term led in June 2001 to a constitutional crisis and a brief bout of factional fighting, but an internal negotiated provisional settlement was reached in 2003. The transfer issue was resolved peacefully in July 2004, with an extension of the mandates of the parliament and the government by six months, instead of the two years originally proposed, and the appointment of a new leaner cabinet. Relative peace in the northeastern region has fostered commerce, inward investment by the diaspora, and some international development assistance.

11. The Somali civil war is neither a traditional clan war nor a by-product of East-West competition in the Horn of Africa, though those two dimensions have played varying roles at different times. It is a modern conflict that has been fed by a long list of grievances against the state, its policies, its ruling elite, and its clients (Marchal and Messiant 1997). Its roots are in the blockages of the command economy that the Siad Barre government attempted to impose on the country after the coup in October 1969; its reluctant and partial move toward economic liberalization in the 1980s, while at the same time attempting to use state levers to maintain political control; its growing reliance on a small group of family, subclan, and business associates to run the country; and its intensified policy since 1978 of “divide and rule” toward clans, regions, and business interests. Although none of these moves proved successful for the country in the long term, they sowed such deep divisions in the country that it was only after a decade and a half of civil war and strife that a reconciliation conference (the 14th) succeeded in electing a broad-based national government. **[[could say 14th over X years?]]**

12. The Somali National Reconciliation Conference that began in October 2002 in Kenya led to representatives of 22 Somali groups establishing a 275-member Federal Transitional Parliament in August 2004, largely based on clan affiliation. In October 2004, the parliament elected Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed, the former president of Puntland, as the interim president of the transitional federal government (TFG). The following month, Abdullahi **[[correct as surname?]]** selected Ali Mohammed Ghedi as prime minister, who in turn obtained approval of his cabinet in January 2005. The TFG moved from Nairobi to Somalia in March 2006. The establishment of the broad-based transitional federal government of Somalia is a positive step but only a first step in the long road toward rebuilding the Somali nation, ensuring continued peace and stability, and moving the country onto the path to sustainable development.

13. Members of the international community met on various occasions in October 2004, March 2005, and May 2005 to discuss how best to support the TFG. Their declarations have emphasized shared priorities of peace building, reconciliation, and reconstruction and have highlighted the need for Somali ownership of these principles. In addition to providing limited provisional financial assistance to the TFG, they have supported the Somali Joint Needs Assessment led by the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank.

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Endnotes

¹ The word *state* is used to denote the institutions of government and does not refer to a geographic level of government (as in national, regional, state, and local).

² Somalia placed 161st out of 163 countries ranked in the 2001 UNDP Human Development Index.

³ The Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference took place in Kenya (2002–04) under the auspices of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)**[[spell out]]** and led to the inauguration of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) in August 2004, the election of the president in October 2004, and the endorsement of the prime minister and the transitional federal government (TFG). The TFG settled in Somalia in June 2004, and Parliament has been in residence in Somalia since early 2006.**[[see queries in note 15; make same changes in both]]**

⁴ See Little 2004**[[2005 listed in biblio]]**: “The government was perceived as little more than a personal patronage machine that benefited certain clans and urban centres, while distributing few resources to the local population. **[[need source details—publisher or other? should cite author-date and put full source in refs list]]**

⁵ A six-person Civil Service Task Force was established by a presidential decree of January 2006. The mandate of the task force includes carrying out the preparatory steps required for the constitution of a civil service commission. The task force has drafted its own internal regulations and is revising the 1980 Civil Service Law.

⁶ Despite few attempts, pastoralist poverty has rarely been addressed in current strategies and practices. See IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), Livestock and Rangeland Knowledgebase, <http://www.ifad.org/lrkm/theme/prm.htm>. **[[link doesn't fit description--at first glance, at least]]**For more information, also see Pastoralists Communication Initiative, the Institute of Development Studies with DFID and UNDP, <http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/particip/research/pci.html>.

⁷ Out of 33 districts, only seven district councils have been selected and are trying to operate, deliver services, and prepare and implement budgets.

⁸ See subcluster report for a district administration budget breakdown and detail.**[[in this cluster report? where specifically?]]**

⁹ See Romeo 2002 on the interdependence of the local and the central **[[what—governments? authorities?]]** in the process of reconstructing states.

¹⁰ Civil society is defined as “organized groups or associations which are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities.” These include service provision NGOs, women’s organizations, youth groups, human rights organizations, community-based organizations, religious groups, research and development institutions, and the independent media. Armed groups, political parties, state-owned media, and the private sector are excluded. Local justice mechanisms, including shari’a courts, elders councils, and community leaders, are included as expressions of community organization.

¹¹ The word *state* is used to denote the institutions of government; it does not refer to a geographic level of government (as in national, regional, state, and local).

¹² Somalia placed 161st out of 163 countries ranked in the 2001 UNDP Human Development Index.

¹³ World Bank estimates of current levels of remittances are US\$1 billion per year. **[[give source?]]**

¹⁴ Constitutional processes are generally categorized under governance headings and not peace building. However, in Somalia, the process of holding dialogues aimed at reconciling and creating acceptance by factions and warlords for the reestablishment of federal government is an integral and essential phase of building peace. Similarly, credibility in government and the building of political legitimacy are overlapping processes, with the former being critical in the earlier stages of building peace, such as is the case today in South Central Somalia, and the latter corresponding to good governance, to be developed in Somaliland and Puntland, and simultaneously with the transitional federal government (TFG) in South Central Somalia.

¹⁵ The Somali National Peace and Reconciliation Conference took place in Kenya (2002–04) under the auspices of IGAD **[[spell out? and over 2 years?]]** and led to the inauguration of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) in August 2004, the election of the president in October 2004, and the endorsement of the prime minister and the transitional federal government (TFG). The TFG settled in Somalia in June 2004, and Parliament has been in residence in Somalia since early 2006. **[[is this description odd?: of govt. of a country settling in that country? and the parliament in residence?]]**

¹⁶ **[[missing source—clarify sentence in text too]]**

¹⁷ Whereas general distrust of government is a barrier to reconciliation, a view shared by many people is that the establishment of a stable government is necessary to bring peace to Somalia. Therefore, a willingness to work with government authorities to make reconciliation succeed is evident, such as in the support shown for the creation of local government councils, involving processes of reconciliation.

¹⁸ Andre Le Sage, “Stateless Justice in Somalia: Formal and Informal Rule of Law Initiatives.” a report submitted to the UNDP Rule of Law and Security (ROLS) Programme. **[[need year; put author-date callout in text and delete footnote]]**

¹⁹ PDRC, Pastoral Justice: A Participatory Action Research Project on Harmonization of Somali Legal Traditions, Garowe, 2002. **[[citation on page also cites bibliog source 24; which is correct source?]]**

²⁰ In Puntland the PDRC has undertaken a number of in-depth studies commissioned through ROLS and Diakonia. ROLS has also commissioned a comprehensive study on informal systems, including for South Central Somalia (André Le Sage **[[need year to cite source; use accented e on all if correct]]**), and the PDRC has been working in Somaliland and now in Puntland to develop action research and reforms in partnership with elders. **[[this is PDRC and not DRC?]]**

²¹ ROLS has been facilitating the translation of a Somali version of key texts.

²² UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme, ongoing; Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights 2005; DFID 2004.

²³ An ongoing debate concerns the issue of harmonization of the main legal frameworks. Though some commentators advocate the codification of customary law or an integration of customary and shari’a processes into the formal structures, others argue that what is needed is a clarification of which law is to be applied when, basic training for all in the three sources of law, and clear referral systems.

²⁴ These estimates were made in early 2006, before the mobilization of groups in support of the Islamic Courts Union.

²⁵ See endnote 4. Peter D. Little “the government was perceived as little more than a personal patronage machine that benefited certain clans and urban centres, while distributing few resources to the local population”, in “Somalia: Economy without a State”, 2004 **[[2005 was given in the bibliog/refs]]**

²⁶ Ken Menkhaus, **[[need to give the year to cite one of the sources in the refs list; can also cross-cite an endnote (in addition to year) if specific info needed]]**

²⁷ According to the constitution, only three political parties can be accredited as national parties; for local elections, their number is not limited.

²⁸ Progressio Parliamentary Elections Report, “Further steps to democracy”, 2006. **[[what is this source? give in full in biblio. Cite as author-date in text]]**

²⁹ This was the composition of the original cabinet, modified in August 2006 to comprise 31 ministries, with 62 ministers and deputy ministers and five ministers of state.

³⁰ A six-person Civil Service Task Force was established by presidential decree of January 2006. The mandate of the task force includes carrying out the preparatory steps required for the constitution of a civil service commission. The task force has drafted its own internal regulations and is revising the 1980 Civil Service Law.

³¹ In 1989 a study by the U.S. Agency for International Development concluded that the civil service was overstaffed by about 60 percent.

³² This particularly refers to the Civil Service Structure Study, commissioned by UNDP. **[[cite this as author-date in text; include in biblio in full]]**

³³ The report on civil service recruitment commissioned by and prepared by POWER concentrates on these issues. **[[cite this report as author-date in text; include in biblio in full]]**

³⁴ UNDP Concept Paper for the MOF and the Offices of Auditor General and Accountant General, January 2006. **[[cite this as author-date in text; include in biblio in full]]**

³⁵ For example, previous attempts to collect company tax based on profits failed because of the private sector’s opposition to revealing details of their business transactions to government. A compromise solution of levying a fixed rate on companies according to the type of business had to be adopted.

³⁶ Payment of salaries is sometimes delayed by months. **[[a month or months?]]** The state government has experienced repeated difficulties in recent years in making civil service salary payments on time, as evidenced by a recent announcement by the president of Puntland that beginning January 2006 all civil service salaries of So. Sh. 800,000 and above would be subject to a 15 percent pay cut with immediate effect. At the same time, the element in ministries’ budgets for recurrent costs was reduced by 30 percent. It is unclear how long these temporary measures will remain in force.

³⁷ In addition, there are two state ministers: of Interior and Security and of the President’s Office. **[[if this is important, wouldn’t it be better to just include in text?]]**

³⁸ This does not include the uniformed services, which reportedly employ 8,000–8,500 personnel.

³⁹ Background Report: Somalia Public Sector Issues, World Bank, February 2005.

⁴⁰ The transitional federal charter set a 12 percent gender quota. Twenty-three women were selected to the transitional federal assembly, with one female cabinet minister and six deputy female ministers appointed.

⁴¹ For a definition of *social capital*, see the work of the political scientist Robert Putnam, and specifically his publication *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton University Press, 1993). Also see the World Bank research work on the same, and specifically for indicators see Grootaert, Narayan, Nyhan Jones, and Woolcock 2004, which notes that “Social capital is most frequently defined in terms of the groups, networks, norms, and trust that people have available to them for productive purposes” (p. 3).

⁴² See Ken Menkhaus (**[[need year]]**) **[[put in biblio]]**: “In some parts of Somalia, local communities are enjoying more responsive and participatory governance, and a more predictable and safe commercial climate, than at any time in recent decades—all without the benefits of a central state” **[[need p. no.]]**.

⁴³ Pastoralist poverty has rarely been addressed in current strategies and practices. **[[two parts are redundant, unless there’s a typo or missing word]]** See IFAD, Livestock and Rangeland Knowledgebase (LRKB) and the Pastoralists Communication Initiative, by IDS, DFID, and UNDP **[[year]]**. **[[cite to refs list]]**

⁴⁴ See subcluster report for a district administration budget breakdown and detail. **[[where would this be? more specific; put only in parens in text; no note unless more info is added]]**

⁴⁵ See World Bank 2006.

⁴⁶ See sub-cluster report for a detailed account. **[[be more specific—title, date; put only in parens in text; no note]]**

⁴⁷ This analysis is based on the report prepared by the World Bank on “Decentralization, Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations & Service Delivery,” March 2006.

⁴⁸ See Romeo 2002 about the interdependence of the local and the central in the process of reconstructing states.

⁴⁹ See the subcluster report for detail on these proposals. **[[give more detail—within this paper? others within this cluster report? just cross-reference in text, delete note]]**

⁵⁰ *Civil society* is defined as “organized groups or associations which are separate from the state, enjoy some autonomy in relations with the state, and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests, values or identities.” **[[note is citing itself—where does this definition come from?]]** These include

service provision NGOs, women's organizations, youth groups, human rights organizations, community-based organizations, religious groups, research and development institutions, and the independent media. Armed groups, political parties, state-owned media, and the private sector are excluded. Local justice mechanisms, including shari'a courts, elders councils, and community leaders, are included as expressions of community organization.

⁵¹ WSP International[[**spell out or identify? a group?**]] is undertaking an electoral project with Somali partners in all Somali regions. This should provide a realistic foundation for developing the performance of civil society in this crucial sector.

⁵² PDRC/Saferworld unpublished research, 2006. [[**identify source—PDRC?**]]

⁵³ The various types of civil society organizations described above have been categorized in a number of surveys conducted over the past two years. NOVIB has a Web site with a civil society register, which is updated by organizations that register (<http://www.somalicivilsociety.org>). [[**identify NOVIB; give surveys that are cited in note 63 (citing this note, but no source is given)**]] It is very difficult to assess traditional and religious groups, which are likely to be significantly underrepresented in existing data. It is notable that civil society organizations are concentrated in areas of relative security and stability.

⁵⁴ The only attempt at engineering a peaceful transition before the insurrection reached the capital city was made in 1990 by about 100 elders from all clans—the Manifesto Group—but that effort was immediately rebuffed by the regime, which jailed its leaders, charged them with treason, and condemned them to death. The subsequent international outcry and the popular show of support in the streets of Mogadishu for the Manifesto elders led the regime to reverse its repressive approach, but both Siad Barre and the uncoordinated clan-based armed movements continued to ignore their political proposal and pursued their clash to the end.